Three out of four Indians think that politician is the biggest culprit for corruption. Or so it would seem from an online survey conducted by TOI for this campaign. The irony is that the national ombudsman for corruption, Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), has no jurisdiction over politicians, the very category perceived to be the biggest culprit.
As a result, in the 2G telecom scam, which has been rated in the same survey as the biggest ever corruption scandal, all that the CVC could do was to recommend to the CBI to register a corruption case, steering clear of the then minister A Raja although he was directly responsible for the alleged deviations.
In a further irony, the CVC is currently headed by the very officer who had served as telecom secretary and had justified the 2G scam. That P J Thomas could be handed over the charge of the CVC despite his controversial background indicates yet another structural deficiency in the anti-corruption regime, which is skewed in favor of politicians.
The government has sought to save its face by reviving the 40-year-old proposal of establishing an ombudsman to deal exclusively with politicians. But the Lokpal envisaged by the government has been denounced by civil society as the idea of having separate watchdog bodies for politicians and bureaucrats smacks of an attempt to maintain the existing level of impunity for corruption.
When Lokpal was first proposed by the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in 1966, the CVC dealing with bureaucrats had already been in existence for two years. So, what the ARC recommended was a body that could probe policy makers at the highest level, ministers and secretaries to the government at the Centre. The danger it posed to those holding the reins of power ensured that the Lokpal Bill never got enacted, despite the motions of being introduced in Parliament repeatedly.
The leeway given to politicians in turn ensured a range of structural deficiencies in the anti-corruption regime. The tokenism is evident even from the modest size of the CVC set up. It has staff strength of less than 200 although it is supposed to check corruption in more than 1,500 Central government departments and ministries. It is therefore reduced to a post office as it is forced to depend on the vigilance wings of the respective departments.
Most complaints received by the CVC are routinely forwarded to the departmental vigilance wings, which are riddled with conflict of interest as they are manned mostly by the staff of those very departments. Whether a complaint is probed by itself or by the departmental wing, all the CVC can do is to recommend d i s c i p l i n a r y action which is often rejected.
As if that were not bad enough, the CVC has no administrative control over officials of the various vigilance wings to which it forwards corruption complaints. Even in the matter of appointing chief vigilance officers of those departmental wings, the CVC's recommendation is not binding on the government. The Thomas episode bears testimony to the deficiencies in the process of appointments to the CVC as well.
Although it turned into a statutory body about a decade ago thanks to the Supreme Court's intervention, the CVC still does not have powers to register criminal cases as it has no investigative machinery at its disposal. It cannot get even the CBI to initiate criminal investigation if the officer accused is of the rank of joint secretary or above. The CBI then would have to seek the permission of the department to which the officer belongs. Despite its muchtouted supervisory powers, the CVC cannot call for any file from the CBI or issue directions to it in any case.
While the CVC has independence, it is sorely lacking in powers. Just the opposite is the case with CBI, which has powers to investigate and prosecute but is deficient in independence. For, it is directly under the control of the Centre, making it vulnerable to charges of conducting politically motivated investigations. Clearly, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have much to feel comfortable with the present legal regime.
WHY THE EXISTING ANTI-CORRUPTION BODIES ARE INEFFECTIVE CVC
No jurisdiction over politicians, only bureaucrats
No power to register criminal cases. It deals only with vigilance or disciplinary matters
No direct power over departmental vigilance wings. It mostly forwards corruption complaints to them and keeps sending reminders
Supervisory powers over CBI have made little difference as CVC can't call for any file or issue directions to the agency
DEPARTMENTAL VIGILANCE WINGS
Manned mostly by officials from within same department, on temporary basis
Since each wing is under direct control of head of department, can hardly probe any senior official of that department.
Even otherwise, in complaints against senior colleague, vigilance officer might hesitate as he could be posted later under the same person
No jurisdiction over politicians and no power to register FIRs against anybody. Can only deal with disciplinary proceedings
CBI
Though it can book cases against bureaucrats and politicians, CBI's independence compromised as it comes directly under Centre’s control
Govt control leaves it vulnerable to charges of investigations being politically motivated
Since it is overburdened, CBI does not accept cases unless amount involved runs into crores
Cannot book cases against officers above the rank of joint secretary without prior sanction from their department
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